Skip to content
Ciberia

Threat Hunting: we look for what is already inside and has not triggered a single alert.

Attackers who use legitimate tools do not always trigger a rule. Our agentic system hunts for them proactively, guided by our own intelligence.

What is threat hunting?

Threat hunting is the proactive search for attackers who are already inside a network and have gone unnoticed by automated detections.

Detection responds to known patterns. Hunting starts from a hypothesis (for example, a specific MITRE ATT&CK technique used by a group that is active in your sector) and tests it against the telemetry in your environment, including going back in time.

What we look for

  • MITRE ATT&CK hypotheses

    Every hunting campaign starts from real attacker techniques, prioritized with intelligence from Ciberia Intel.

  • Retrospective hunting

    When a new indicator appears, we check whether it was already in your environment weeks or months ago.

  • Persistence and lateral movement

    We track credential abuse, persistence mechanisms and the use of legitimate tools that a rule tends to miss.

  • New rules from every finding

    What we find becomes detection rules for Ciberia MDR, so the next time an alert fires.

One hypothesis, from start to finish.

Pick a hypothesis and watch it move through the MITRE ATT&CK tactics until it becomes a detection rule.

Interactive threat hunting example on the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix. Pick a hypothesis: the expected attack path is traced, a 90-day retrospective search confirms each technique, and the finding becomes a detection rule.

Hypothesis

MITRE ATT&CK® Enterprise v19. Sample scenarios.

Is someone signing in with legitimate credentials from where they shouldn't?

TA0043Reconnais­sance
  • T1595Active Scanning
  • T1598Phishing for Information
TA0042Resource Development
  • T1588Obtain Capabilities
  • T1583Acquire Infra­structure
TA0001Initial Access
  • T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • T1566Phishing
  • T1133External Remote Services
TA0002Execution
  • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • T1204User Execution
  • T1047Windows Management Instru­mentation
TA0003Persistence
  • T1053Scheduled Task/Job
  • T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
TA0004Privilege Escalation
  • T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
  • T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
  • T1543Create or Modify System Process
TA0005Stealth
  • T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
  • T1070Indicator Removal
  • T1036Masquerading
TA0112Defense Impairment
  • T1556Modify Authenti­cation Process
  • T1685Disable or Modify Tools
  • T1112Modify Registry
TA0006Credential Access
  • T1110Brute Force
  • T1539Steal Web Session Cookie
  • T1003OS Credential Dumping
  • T1555Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007Discovery
  • T1082System Information Discovery
  • T1018Remote System Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement
  • T1570Lateral Tool Transfer
  • T1021Remote Services
  • T1550Use Alternate Authenti­cation Material
TA0009Collection
  • T1213Data from Information Repositories
  • T1560Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control
  • T1572Protocol Tunneling
  • T1071Application Layer Protocol
  • T1219Remote Access Tools
TA0010Exfiltration
  • T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
  • T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040Impact
  • T1486Data Encrypted for Impact
  • T1490Inhibit System Recovery
  • T1657Financial Theft

Swipe to scroll through the 15 tactics

Tracing the hypothesis on the matrix.

Retrospective searchwaiting

Finding

Shows up once the path is confirmed.

New detection rule

  1. T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information (Reconnais­sance): Staff email addresses published in a leak, 88 days ago.
  2. T1650 Acquire Access (Resource Development): Corporate access for sale on an underground market, 74 days ago.
  3. T1078 Valid Accounts (Initial Access): Valid sign-in from a country with no prior activity, 61 days ago.
  4. T1098 Account Manipulation (Persistence): New MFA method registered at 03:12, 55 days ago.
  5. T1087 Account Discovery (Discovery): Bulk directory queries from that account, 40 days ago.
  6. T1114 Email Collection (Collection): Forwarding rule created in the mailbox, 22 days ago.
  7. T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service (Exfiltration): Files uploaded to personal web storage, 9 days ago.
  8. Finding: A compromised account had been active for 61 days without triggering a single alert. New detection rule: New MFA method registered, followed by a forwarding rule within 24 hours.

How hunting works

  1. 1

    Hypothesis

    We start from the activity of groups and campaigns that Ciberia Intel detects.

  2. 2

    Search

    We test the hypothesis against the telemetry in your environment, both current and historical.

  3. 3

    Finding

    Evidence, scope, affected asset and risk level, in a single view of the platform.

  4. 4

    Rule

    The finding becomes a new Ciberia MDR detection.

Frequently asked questions

How is threat hunting different from automated detection?

Detection reacts to known patterns. Hunting actively looks for suspicious behavior that has not yet generated a clear alert.

Do you need to install anything on my systems?

No. Hunting is done on the telemetry from the tools you already have integrated with Ciberia (EDR, SIEM and other log sources).

What do I receive at the end?

The findings with their evidence, the potential impact and the queries used, visible in the platform, plus the new rules added to detection.

Let's talk about your security.

We show you the platform with your technology in mind and look at what we can automate from day one.